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GROUND COMMUNICATIONS RELIABILITY REPORT
INTRODUCTION
General
The NASCOM Network is a global point-to-point communications systems
developed to support manned space flights and unmanned scientific satellite mis-
sions. Tracking stations and NASA facilities throughout the world are intercon-
nected by communications satellites, landlines, submarine cables and HF radio
circuits. These circuits carry Teletype, voice, and high-speed data in real-
time support of missions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) of, the United States of America.
The report presents a reliability performance analysis of the NASCOM Net-
work circuits. A Network performance narrative summary is presented first
including significant changes in circuit configurations, current month's figures
with significant factors, and a discussion of trends in each trouble category with
notable circuit totals specified. This is followed by lost time and interruption
tables listing circuits which were affected by outages showing their totals by
trouble categories. Other tables and graphs present current and prior months'
figures on such pertinent subjects as circuit mode totals, network lost time, net-
work reliabilities, numbers of stations and circuits. Then a list is presented,
showing the circuits that did not meet the NASCOM performance objectives,
followed by a discussion of circuits that fell appreciably below these objectives,
i. e., a narrative of individual circuit performance, is given only for those circuits
whose reliabilities fell below 95. 0% on high-frequency radio and 99. 5% on all others.
Along with this, a special analysis of circuits whose reliabilities have been low
for three months or more is given, with tables depicting three month's perfor-
mance and graphs of individual path reliabilities.
The performance objectives for the various media established for the net-
work and published in part VII, paragraph 2. 4. 1 of the NASCOM Data Systems
Development Plan are as follows.
a. Communications Satellite . . . . . . . . . . ... 99. 8%
b. Microwave and landline . . . . . . . . ...... 99. 8%
c. Submarine cable ... . . . . . . . . . . . ... 99. 8%
d. High-frequency radio . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 97. 0%
1
Circuits composed of segments that use different media for transmission
are evaluated on the basis of the media with the lowest objective. Thus, a cir-
cuit that contains a landline and a high-frequency radio segment is expected to
perform at 97. 0% or better.
Definition of Terms
Narrative and tabular data are given in an alphanumeric order by geographic
locations. In those tables listing circuit numbers, the station name headings are
one of several forms and indicate the circuit's terminal point. Circuits which con-
nect Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) with a distant site or NASA switching
center are listed under the appropriate geographic name such as 'Houston' or
"Canberra. " Circuits which connect GSFC with more than one terminal location
are listed under a joint heading such as "Cape Kennedy & Houston. ' Those cir-
cuits connecting a distant NASA site with a switching center other than GSFC are
listed under the distant site's geographic name followed by the location of the
switching center. Examples of this are circuits from Madrid to Johannesburg,
South Africa which have the heading "Johannesburg/Madrid" and circuits from the
Canberra switching center to the Canberra Apollo site which are listed under Can-
berra Apollo/Canberra. Furthermore, those circuits routed by way of a signifi-
cant intermediate system are so indicated by notation such as "via COMPAC cable"
or "via Satellite" following the appropriate heading.
Operational reliability as used in this report, is defined as the ratio of
realized or actual station/circuit or network operating time to the total scheduled
operating time, with this ratio then being expressed in percent.
In order to categorize stations/circuits for convenience in comparison, all
percentages calculated for the various circuits have been rounded off to the nearest
whole number. Thus, a calculated 86. 32 percent is entered as 86 percent, and
99.65 percent as 100 percent. It must always be inferred that comparisons are
made with figures of the previous month unless a definite statement indicates a
comparison with figures of a different period. "Average Reliability" figures listed
in Table 4 are based on the months of service shown in that table.
The totals for scheduled operating hours have been rounded off to the nearest
hour.
The terms "transmit" and "receive" are used to denote transmission to and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data or information used in preparing this report has been obtained
from:
Trouble Tickets (GSFC Form 22-35)
NASA Circuit Logs (GSFC Form 28-8T)
Daily Communication Report (DCR)
The Trouble Tickets and Daily Communication Reports provide most of
the data or information used. To provide a "common denominator" for record-
ing and interpreting trouble areas, various trouble categories have been devised.
Incidents are extracted and classified on this basis, permitting interruption pat-
terns to be determined quantitatively. Category designations are shown in Table
1.
Whenever a discrepancy or an ambiguity appears in the Trouble Tickets or
in any of the other data sources listed above, Network Review and Analysis Branch
personnel then contact the site or station involved to clarify, correct, or recon-
cile the data. Comments or questions concerning this report should be directed
to Head, Network Review and Analysis Branch, Goddard Space Flight Center,
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771, Code 843.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT F'IEID
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SUMMARY OF NASCOM NETWORK PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The maximum number of circuits utilized during February was 497, 13 less than
the prior month. The individual circuit mode totals were Z36 for alternate voice/data,
128 for voice-only, 105 for Teletype, 26 data-only, and two voice/facsimile circuits.
The net decrease in station/facilities served was one, from 95 to 94.
During the month, 212 circuits incurred interruptions to service during their
scheduled operating time and their combined lost service totaled 1, 158:56 hours. This
represented a decrease of 19 percent over the prior amount of 1,427:35 hours. The
lost time was distributed among the five circuit modes with individual totals of 703:15
hours on 116 alternate voice/data circuits, 378:12 hours on 54 Teletype circuits, 54:06
hours on 29 voice-only circuits, 21:28 hours on 12 data-only circuits and 1:55 hours on
one voice/facsimile circuit. Interruptions to service decreased from 1,269 to 1, 162
and the net result was a decrease in the "Mean Time To Repair" figure from 1:07 to
1:01 hours. Network performance for the current and prior months is listed in
Tables 3 and 5 where fluctuations in monthly totals may be noted. The distribution of
lost time in each trouble category is shown in Table 7 and the distribution of interrup-
tions in Table 8.
Lost time was distributed in six trouble categories. The largest individual amount
was 954:09 hours for commercial carrier failures which accounted for 82. 3 percent of
the total outage. The other category amounts were 174:51 hours, 15. 1 percent for
nature faults; 12:19 hours, 1. 1 percent for equipment fault/adjustment; 7:21 hours,
0. 6 percent for computer fault; 6:34 hours, 0. 6 percent for power supply fault, and
3:42 hours, 0. 3 percent for RFO unknown.
Seventy of the 212 circuits that incurred outages had operational reliabilities below
those specified for their transmission media (as defined on page 1). These involved
service to 27 stations and their combined total lost time of 1, 016:56 hours represented
88 percent of the network total.
Commercial carrier failures accounted for all or the majority of lost time on 69
of the 70 circuits that failed. These are noted alphabetically by station name in the
following paragraphs and, where significant, lesser totals in other categories are
given.
Three circuits; CAV-1, 2 and 3, from Grand Canary Island to Ascension Island;
had 4:50 hours each. Circuit TGBR-1 from Madrid, Spain to Bretigny-sur-Orge,
France had 2:54 hours. Teletype circuit NST-3308 to Cambridge (SAO), Massachusetts
had 4:21 hours.
Fourteen circuits serving Australian stations included three to Canberra via
satellite; these were GDA-58449, 7:50 hours; GDA-58451, 6:18 hours and GDA-58521
with 4:23 hours. Two others routed via the COMPAC cable to Canberra were GDA-58531
and 58548 with 11:18 and 3:16 hours, respectively. Another pair to Canberra via the
M2 and COMPAC cables were GDA-58175 with 7:50 hours and GDA-58547 with 7:47
hours. The eighth was NCT-272 from Canberra to the DAF-21 site at Orroral Valley
with 2:50 hours.
6
The remaining six circuits served Carnarvon and included 2GT-67 from Pasadena
WCSC via satellite with 4:30 hours. The other five were from Canberra; NCT-673 and
674 with 3:36 hours each, NCV-622 with 10:54 hours, NCV-624 with 9:20 hours and
NCV-631 with 4:12 hours.
Four circuits to Cape Kennedy XY each had 3:14 hours due to commercial carrier
faults. These were GD-58418, 58419, GDA-58283 and 58614.
Circuit NST-3304 to Bendix facilities at Columbia, Maryland had 3:00 hours. Two
serving Corpus Christi, Texas were GDA-58444 and 58633 with respective totals of
3:46 and 2:38 hours.
Alaskan circuits included three serving Gilmore Creek. GDA-58431 had 4:11 hours
and GDA-58432 had 3:55 hours; the third was GDA-58565 via satellite with 29:53 hours.
Three circuits to the Smith Building at Glenn Dale were 74GL-Z370 and 2371 with
9:16 hours each and 74GL-2372 with 3:40 hours.
Four circuits serving Grand Canary Island had notable commercial carrier outage
totals. On three satellite circuits, these were 77:16, 22:08 and 22:50 hours, respec-
tively, on GDA-58513, 58514 and 58515. The other circuit, CMV-40 from Madrid via
Cadiz, had 5:32 hours.
Two circuits to Halethorpe, Maryland were NST-3626 with 3:50 hours and
NST-3798-T with 23:20 hours.
Commercial carrier failures represented most of the lost time on the five circuits,
AJV-1 through 5, from Ascension Island to Johannesburg, South Africa. Respective
totals were 8:19, 10:30, 4:20, 6:37 and 11:14 hours. In addition, AJV-1 through 4 each
had 3:08 hours and AJV-5 had 6:40 hours for nature fault.
A total of 4:21 hours were recorded on 2GW-2 from Pasadena WCSC to Boeing at
Kent, Washington.
Circuits from Madrid to London included TGPM-2 and 7 with 3:25 and 9:51 hours,
respectively.
Two circuits to Madrid included GDA-58655 via satellite with 2:14 hours and
GDA-58456 via the TAT-5 cable with 26:07 hours.
The lost times on GDA-58336 and NST-3019-T; from Pasadena WCSC to the Ames
Research Center at Moffett Field, California; were 21:26 and 76:26 hours, respectively.
Circuit GDA-58620 to Pasadena WCSC had 3:33 hours.
Two satellite circuits to Quito, Ecuador were GDA-58420 with 49:09 hours and
GDA-59382 with 73:03 hours. The first circuit also had 6:32 hours for equipment fault.
Seven circuits to Rosman, North Carolina had notable commercial carrier outage
totals. These were 21:17 hours on GDA-58152, 9:49 hours on GDA-58437, 11:18 hours
on GDA-58448, 2:55 hours on GW-58499, 14:41 hours on NST-3307, 16:29 hours on
NST-3316 and 22:16 hours on NST-3317.
7
Circuits serving Santiago, Chile, GDA-58454, 58488 and 58665 had respective
totals of 5:13, 12:13 and 21:14 hours.
Stiles Cove, Newfoundland had three circuits; GDA-58691 with 3:18 hours,
GDA-58697 with 5:10 hours and GDA-58698 with 3:18 hours.
Satellite circuits to Tananarive, Malagasy Republic were GDA-58524 with 10:22
hours and GDA-58525 with 13:08 hours. Each also had 2:00 hours for an equipment fault.
Teletype circuit GT-58837 to Waltham, Massachusetts had 5:15 hours.
Nature faults, in the form of flooding, accounted for 143:57 hours on GT-58828 to
the USNS Vanguard at Hoboken, New Jersey. Other category contributions were 8:08
hours for commercial carrier and 2:54 hours for power supply faults.
Refer to Tables 1 and 2 for outages and interruptions, respectively, on all
circuits and to the discussions following Figure 4 for analysis of significant failures on
circuits which were below a reliability criteria of 99, 5 percent.
GSFC-494 Switching Computer
Three UNIVAC-494 switching computers, designated as "A", 'IB' and "C", serve
the on-line and off-line operations at the GSFC switching center. These units are
alternated on-line as required to switch and control data through the center. No
scheduled interruptions to service were necessary during February but three trouble
incidents accounted for 5 minutes of outage. The reliability of the switching computer
function was 99. 99 percent during 672:00 hours of scheduled operation.
On-line operation of the "A" computer was affected for 1 minute on February 17 by
a data problem with the Pasadena WCSC. Service was transferred to the "C" computer.
On February 28, memory faults caused 3 minutes of lost time during "B" computer
operation and made a switch to the "C' computer necessary,
Operation of the "C" computer incurred a system fault on February 16 that
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ERCIAL 1. 1% EQUIPMENT FAULT/
ER FAULT I ADJUSTMENT
2. 3% 0. 6% COMPUTER FAULT
0. 6% POWER SUPPLY FAULT
0. 3% RFO UNKNOWN
Figure 3. NASCOM Network Percentage of Outage Time by Trouble







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Outage Time and
Reliability Indexes for One Year
TROUBLE CATEGORIES MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972
RFO Unknown 8:21 4:27 2:54 1:58 2:39 1:43
Commercial Carrier Fault 1,654:05 1,494:35 1,198:36 1, 935:00 1,182:46 1,958:43
Personnel Error 6:12 7:41 4:42 36:01 10:19 :22
Equipment Fault/Adjustment 44:26 38:26 10:33 90:40 35:44 69:35
Computer Fault 41:21 26:36 14:38 8:41 33:25 6:52
Radio Frequency Anomalies 159:59 198:06 172:39 33:44 59:31 287:40
Power Supply Fault 25:32 4:44 5:06 8:42 33:06 6:55
TOTAL OUTAGE 1,939:56 1,774:35 1,409:08 2, 114:46 1,357:30 2,331:50
SCHED OPER TIME 597, 515 698, 553 542, 406 515, 975 530,410 538, 235
RELIABILITY (Percent) 100 100 100 100 100
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN A3
TROUBLE CATEGORIES 1972 1972 1972 1972 1973 1973
RFO Unknown 10:26 2:30 3:04 1:07 7:08 3:42
Commercial Carrier Fault 1,377:31 4,217:09 1, 697:30 1, 518:24 1,132:29 954:09
Personnel Error :14 3:26 3:11 5:23 25:46
Equipment Fault/Adjustment 57:28 26:16 219:14 23:16 106:38 12:19
Computer Fault 7:56 23:54 10:08 13:48 9:48 7:21
Radio Frequency Anomalies 36:17 20:51 79:41 155:39 135:38
Nature Fault 
- - - - - 174:51
Power Supply Fault 2:04 11:00 74:48 93:02 10:08 6:34
TOTAL OUTAGE 1,491:56 4, 305:06 2, 087:36 1, 810:39 1,427:35 1,158:56
SCHED OPER TIME 563, 132 596, 834 645, 026 715, 923 694,465 636, 601
RE LIABILITY (Percent) 100 100 100 100 100 100
24
Table 4
NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION CIRCUIT SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE



































































(1) Deactivated February 15
(2) Activated February 1, Deactivated February 21
(3) Upgraded to alternate voice/data mode on August 16
















































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION I CIRCUIT |SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN I FEB AVERAGE
I____ 1 1 1972 1972 1972 1 1972 1 1973 1973 RELIABILITY
Canberra & Honolulu




























































100 99 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100







































































































































































(1) Activated February 4
















































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE






































































































































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION CIRCUIT SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE


























































































































































































































(1) Activated November 17
(2) Deactivated December 20, Activated January 22, Deactivated February 20
(3) Deactivated February 28
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I
Table 4 (Continued)
NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION I CIRCUIT | SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE


















Honolulu via M1 Cable
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(1) Deactivated December 20, Activated January 22, Deactivated February 20
(2) Deactivated December 19, Activated January 24, Deactivated February 21
(3) Activated January 19, Deactivated February 16
(4) Activated January 18, Deactivated February 16




















































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability















































(1) Activated November 15
(2) Activated November 16
(3) Activated October 25

















































































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGESTATION | CIRCUIT


















































(1) Activated October 25
(2) Activated September 1






































































































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION SEP OCT NOVI DECI JAN FEB AVERAGE





Kennedy Space Center &
Greenbelt (GSFC)/
Houston
Kennedy Space Center &
Huntsville /Houston

































































































































































































































100 100 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
(1) Activated September 1
(2) Activated September 2
(3) Activated February 21
(4) Activated December 22
(5) Activated November 29
(6) Activated September 15
(7) Activated November 6







































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION 1 CIRCUIT I SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGES 1972 1972 1972 1972 1973 1973 RELIABILITY
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NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION I CIRCUIT | SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE























































(1) Activated October 20

















































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGESTATION CIRCUIT 1 























































(1) Activated January 1
(2) Activated September 15
(3) Deactivated December 20, Activated January 23


















































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE

























































(1) Activated November 8
(2) Routed via Satellite September 5
(3) Routed via Satellite September 8
(4) Activated October 19



















































































































































































































































































NASCOM Network Circuit Reliability
STATION 1 CIRCUIT SEP 1OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB AVERAGE
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(1) Activated December 9
(2) Activated January 5
(3) Activated November 15
(4) Activated January 1
(5) Activated November 29






































































NASCOM Network Data and Lost Time
for One Year
Table 6




NUMBER NUMBER TIME MEAN TIME
MONTH OF OF (Hours INTERRUPTIONS TO REPAIR
STATIONS CIRCUITS and
Minutes)
Feb (1973) 94 497 1,158:56 1,162 1:01
Jan (1973) 95 510 1,427:35 1,269 1:07
Dec (1972) 101 613 1,810:39 1,669 1:05
Nov (1972) 98 610 2,087:36 1,579 1:19
Oct (1972) 89 507 4, 305:06 2, 339 1:50
Sep (1972) 86 495 1,491:56 1,834 :48
Aug (1972) 86 466 2,331:50 1,947 1:11
Jul (1972) 85 462 1,357:30 2,152 :37
Jun (1972) 87 472 2,114:46 1,662 1:16
May (1972) 86 475 1,409:08 1,990 :42
Apr (1972) 90 603 1,774:35 2, 270 :46





























































































































































































































































































































(T) ALL TROUBLE COMBINED
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N;
Figure 4. NASCOM Network Lost Time by Trouble Categories for One Year
A
j
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSES OF PERFORMANCE
OF INDIVIDUAL CIRCUITS
General
This section of the NASCOM Network reliability report examines the perform-
ance of the circuits, on an individual circuit and station basis, which failed to meet
their NASCOM performance objective. The stations are presented in alphabetical
order and the circuit discussions are limited to significant outages of 1:00 hour or
greater. In addition to a narrative, a table and graph depicting current and prior data
and performance are presented for those circuits whose reliabilities have been low .for
3 or more consecutive months.
List of Circuits
41
PERFORMANCE RELI- DIFFER- MONTHS
STATION CIRCUIT OBJECTIVE ABILITY ENCE LISTED
Ascension Island/ CAV-1 99. 80 99. 52 .28 1
Grand Canary Island -2 99. 80 99. 64 .16 1
-3 99.80 99.64 .16 1
Bretigny-sur-Orge/ TGBR-1 99. 80 99.78 .02 4
Madrid
Cambridge (SAO) NST-3308 99. 80 99. 66 .14 3
Canberra via Satellite GDA-58449 99.80 99.41 .39 1
-58451 99.80 99.53 .27 6
-58521 99.80 99.67 .13 6
Canberra via COMPAC GDA-58531 99. 80 99. 15 . 65 1
Cable -58548 99.80 99.74 .06 2
Canberra & Honolulu GDA-58175 99. 80 99. 41 . 39 1
via M2 & COMPAC -58547 99.80 99.42 .38 1
Cables
Canberra DAF-21 NCT-272 99. 80 99. 78 .02 1
(Orroral Valley)/
Canberra
Cape Kennedy XY GD-58418 99.80 99.75 .05 1
-58419 99.80 99.75 .05 1
GDA-58283 99.80 99.74 .06 1
-58614 99.80 99.74 .06 1
Carnarvon/Pasadena 2GT-67 99.80 99.66 .14 5
WCSC via Satellite
Carnarvon/Canberra NCT-673 99.80 99.72 .08 11
-674 99.80 99.72 .08 10
NCV-622 99.80 99.18 .62 1
-624 99.80 99.30 .50 1
-631 99.80 99.68 .12 1
Columbia (Bendix) NST-3304 99.80 99.76 .04 2
STATION | CIRCUIT |IPERFORMANCE RELI- DIFFER- MONTHS
Il__ I OBJECTIVE [ABILITY ENCE LISTED



















































































































































































































































Commercial carrier problems were solely responsible for the total lost time of
7:50 hours on GDA-58449 and the resultant reliability of 99 percent. On February 5, a
system failure between Newbern, Illinois and Lamar, Colorado caused a transmit path
loss of 1:16 hours. PMG personnel at the Canberra Central Exchange performed
unauthorized maintenance and caused a 1:15-hour loss on both paths February 15.
Faulty group equipment at PMG facilities, Sydney, Australia caused an outage on both
paths of 1:39 hours on February 17; this problem was resolved by patching the circuit
between Canberra and Sydney.
CANBERRA VIA COMPAC CABLE
A total outage of 11:18 hours on GDA-58531 was attributed to commercial carrier
problems and was sufficient to reduce circuit reliability to 99 percent. Three signifi-
cant disruptions affecting both paths included 1:00 hour on February 4 due to an
undetermined problem; faulty group equipment at PMG facilities, Sydney for a
1:39-hour loss of service on February 17 and the third outage, 1:15 hours on Febru-
ary 15, was caused by PMG personnel performing unauthorized maintenance at the
Canberra Central Exchange.
CANBERRA & HONOLULU VIA M2 & COMPAC CABLE
As in the case of other circuits serving Canberra, commercial carrier problems
were solely responsible for the total lost times of 7:50 and 7:47 hours on GDA-58175
and 58547, respectively. Two significant disruptions, common to both circuits,
included 1:15 hours on each February 15 when unauthorized maintenance was performed
by PMG personnel at the Canberra Central Exchange and 1:39 hours on February 17
caused by bad group equipment at PMG Sydney. Both paths were affected in each
instance.
CARNARVON/CANBERRA
Commercial carrier faults were solely responsible for NCV-622 and 624 not meeting
their prescribed performance objective of 99. 8 percent. The reliability of each was
99 percent. Unauthorized maintenance performed by PMG personnel at the Canberra
Central Exchange disrupted both paths of NCV-622 for 1:15 hours on February 15.
Faulty group equipment at PMG facilities in Sydney interrupted service on both paths of
NCV-622 for 1:39 hours on February 17. A third outage on NCV-622 was 2:00 hours
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T PERFORMANCE RELI- DIFFER- MONTHSSTATION CIRCUIT OBJECTIVE ABILITY ENCE LISTED
Stiles Cove GDA-58698 99. 80 99. 75 .05 1
Tananarive via GDA-58524 99.80 99. 01 .79 10
Satellite -58525 99.80 98.80 1.00 4
Waltham (Reservoir) GT-58837 99.80 99. 59 .21 1
February 26 caused by an unspecified problem between NASA facilities and Carnarvon
that cleared during investigation.
Coaxial failure in Melbourne caused a loss of 2:30 hours on both paths of NCV-624
February 15. The next day, both paths of the same circuit were affected by a broadband
failure between Melbourne, Sydney and Perth. The resultant loss was 1:35 hours.
GILMORE CREEK VIA SATELLITE
The reliability of GDA-58565 decreased from 100 to 98 percent due to commercial
carrier failures. Three caused notable interruptions to service. In each of the three
instances, the initial symptom was noted as the inability to pass 7. 2 kbps data. On
February 3, both paths were affected in this manner for 2:00 hours. When the problem
was corrected, the cause was given as phase jitter trouble on ATT facilities between
Greenbelt, Maryland and Oakland, California. The receive path was out of service for
8:27 hours on February 27 with the first 1:10 hours due to noise on the satellite facilities
between Fairbanks, Alaska and Jamesburg, California and the remaining 7:17 hours
attributed to an undetermined cause between the same locations. The next day, another
undetermined problem on the same segment caused an interruption of 7:35 hours to
both paths.
GLENN DALE (SMITH BUILDING)
Two commercial carrier problems were sufficient to reduce the reliability of
circuits 74GL-2370 and 2371 to 99 percent. On February 8 double rings on both circuits
were corrected after 2:48 hours but no RFO was given. The next day, both circuits
would ring in when only one was activated. This was corrected by releasing pick-ups
in building 12 at GSFC; the lost times were 1:50 hours on each circuit and, as in the
first problem, both paths were affected.
GRAND CANARY ISLAND
Circuits GDA-58514 and 58515 had reliabilities of 98 percent, down from the
previous figures of 100 percent. Their receive paths were affected by high impulse
noise February 1 on the satellite segment between earth stations at Aguimes, GCI
and Etam, West Virginia. The problem was corrected the next day with the report
that the circuits were back on normal channels. Lost time on each was 19:30 hours.
On February 11, the transmit path of GDA-58514 had low levels and would not pass
7. 2 kbps data. The problem continued for 1:04 hours and no RFO was given. A faulty
amplifier at ATT New York-2 was affecting GDA-58513 in a like manner during the
same period and may have contributed to this outage.
HOBOKEN (USNS VANGUARD)
For the second consecutive month, GT-58828 failed to meet the desired level of
performance. The 80 percent reliability this month is attributed to reduced scheduled
operating hours, 384:00, and a notable increase in total loss time from 32:14 hours to
154:59 hours. During this report period, the circuit incurred five significant dis-
ruptions, three of which were due to flooded cables in Hoboken, New Jersey. These
included 63:40 hours between February 3 and February 6 on the transmit path and
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62:17 hours on the receive. Later, on February 6, both paths were again reported out
of service for a similar problem. ATT personnel investigated and found the condition to
be "flooded manholes" between the shipyard at Hoboken and the frame room at ATT.
The resultant loss continued into February 7 for a total of 9:00 hours. A bad repeater
on ATT facilities in Hoboken caused an interruption of 4:04 hours that affected both paths
on February 1. The fifth significant disruption occurred on February 10/11 when a
power failure on board the USNS Vanguard disrupted both paths for 1:27 hours.
JOHANNESBURG/ASCENSION ISLAND
The five circuits serving these stations, AJV-1 through 5 each had reliabilities of
99 percent. Significant disruptions common to all circuits included 1:34 hours on
February 6 when storms in South Africa disrupted service on both paths of each; a bad
group between Welkom and Johannesburg caused a 1:26-hour loss on both paths of each
February 8.
Other disruptions affecting both paths of the individual circuits included 1:10 hours
on AJV-2 and 1:40 hours on AJV-5. Microwave trouble between Johannesburg and
Bloemfontein was responsible for these February 12 outages. The receive paths of
AJV-1, 4 and 5 were affected by an unknown problem for 2:17 hours on February 4.
The receive paths of AJV-1 and AJV-5 would not pass 7. 2 kbps data on February 20.
No reason for the problem was established and the resultant losses were 1:42 hours on
AJV-1 and 1:17 hours on AJV-5. A faulty equalizer at Capetown interrupted service
on the transmit path of AJV-2 for 3:50 hours on February 19. Both paths of AJV-5
were lost for 1:46 hours on February 6 reportedly due to bad weather in South Africa.
LONDON /MADRID
Circuit TGPM-7 had a reliability of 99 percent due primarily to commercial
carrier failures with lost times ranging from 5 to 57 minutes, and a combined amount
of 9:51 hours.
MADRID VIA TAT-5 CABLE
The reliability of GDA-58456 decreased from 99 to 98 percent due, for the most
part, to an increase of over 50 percent in commercial carrier lost time. The longest
interruption to service occurred on February 23 when the receive path would not pass
7. 2 kbps data for 7:08 hours. When service was restored, carrier personnel reported
no trouble was found. Prior to that problem, a total outage of 6:29 hours occurred on
both paths February 21. The initial symptoms were low levels and intermittent opens.
The first 1:07 hours were attributed to a cable trouble at Madrid, the next 45 minutes
were caused by a faulty carrier system between New York and GSFC, then 1:16 hours
were used in checking impulse noise and the last 3:21 hours were due to a power supply
failure between Puertollano and Montoro, Spain. On February 5, a faulty carrier
system at Madrid caused an open circuit condition on the transmit path for 1:01 hours.
MOFFETT FIELD (AMES RESEARCH CENTER) /PASADENA WCSC
The total lost times of 21:26 hours on GDA-58336 and 76:26 hours on NST-3019-T
were attributed to commercial carrier problems. Significant disruptions affecting
GDA-58336 included 12:10 hours on February 16/17 due to a reported high error rate,
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the cause of which was not found and a bad "T" carrier between Mountain View and San
Francisco for 9:16 hours on February 22. Both outages were recorded on the transmit
path.
On February 6, NST-3019-T was disrupted when a leased cable failed between Los
Angeles and Pasadena. The circuit was restored by using other facilities between the
above locations and the resultant loss was 69:39 hours. A defective repeater card at
Mountain View, California caused an open condition and a disruption of 2:30 hours on
February 13. A third fault was an open condition on February 6 for 4:15 hours. No
cause was determined for the problem.
Resultant reliabilities were 98 percent on GDA-58336 and 94 on NST-3019-T.
QUITO VIA SATELLITE
The reliability of circuit GDA-58420 decreased from 100 to 96 percent due primarily
to increased commercial carrier outage. Most of this was recorded on the receive path.
On February 1, high block errors caused an outage of 1:16 hours with no cause found
for the problem. The next major commercial carrier outage occurred February 22
when the same path had noise and would not pass 7. 2 kbps data. The cause was traced
to adjacent channel interference by a carrier system from France. The resulting lost
time was 2:36 hours. On February 25 the receive path again would not pass 7. 2 kbps
data. Service was affected for 4:18 hours with no cause determined. A fourth major
failure began on February 27 when the receive path was unable to pass 7. 2 kbps data.
RCA at New York advised GSFC that IMC at Quito is unmanned between 1200 and 2400Z
daily and that this would serve to prolong the interruption to service. The interruption
continued until March 1. Investigation during the outage placed the trouble between the
earth stations at Etam, West Virginia and Quito. Subsequent problems including power
failures extended and complicated the investigation so that 40:11 hours of lost time were
recorded in February. The RFO was given as feedover from adjacent channels on the
satellite segment.
Low levels on the transmit path were the beginning of a 6:32-hour outage on Febru-
ary 23/24. This was attributed to an on-site line trouble at Quito.
ROSMAN
Lost time due to commercial carrier problems caused reliabilities of 99 percent on
circuits GDA-58437, 58448, NST-3307 and 3316. A fifth circuit, NST-3317 was 98
percent.
Two notable common failures affected the receive paths of the alternate voice/data
circuits. On February 5, circuit GDA-58448 was logged out of service at 1435Z and,
40 minutes later, similar symptoms were noted on GDA-58437. Both circuits were
restored at 2206Z after outages of 7:30 hours on the first circuit and 6:51 hours on the
other. The cause was given as trouble on ground and cable carrier between Asheville
and Brevard, North Carolina. The other common fault occurred on February 7 when
the same path would not pass 7. 2 kbps data. An outage of 2:29 hours was recorded
before the unknown problem, located between Asheville and Rosman, cleared during
inve s tigatio n.
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The three Teletype circuits also had common problems that occurred on February 5.
At 1852Z, garbling and an intermittent open condition affected both paths of these
circuits. The outage ticket was closed at 1954Z, after interruptions of 1:02 hours on
each circuit, and another ticket initiated at the same time. The symptom reported on
the second ticket was "hitting up" and this cleared after 2:20 hours with no cause deter-
mined. A common sympton of open in both directions was noted on these circuits on
February 7. NST-3307 was restored after 53 minutes by adjustment of bias; NST-3316
was back after 2:38 hours with the cause specified as a faulty channel at Charlotte,
North Carolina and NST-3317 was affected for 6:38 hours before the problem cleared
during investigations.
Three other notable failures included a line trouble between Asheville and Charlotte
that affected both paths of NST-3316 for 3:18 hours and an open on NST-3307 for 1:10
hours on February 22. This latter problem affected both paths and was attributed to an
in-house trouble at WUT Washington, D. C. Circuit NST-3307 was out of service on
the transmit path for 1:15 hours February 28 while WUT realigned the circuit between
Nashville, Tennessee and Atlanta, Georgia.
SANTIAGO VIA SATELLITE
A reduction in lost time due to commercial carrier failures was responsible for an
increase in reliability from 96 to 99 percent on GDA-58488. Of 13 failures in this
category during February, four caused notable interruptions to the receive path. On
February 5, an open condition between ATT and ITT facilities in New York caused a
1:52-hour outage. Two problems occurred on February 13. First, a noise condition
was caused by microwave trouble between E1l Roble Hill and Santiago, Chile and result-
ed in a 1:24 hour interruption. Following this, high levels were caused by a problem
on ATT facilities between Greenbelt, Maryland and New York. The lost time was
1:07 hours. Noise, again, caused a 2:10-hour loss on February 24 and was attributed
to a defective loop between ATT and ITT in New York City.
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Circuits With Consecutive Low Reliabilities
Grand Canary Island via Satellite- GDA-58513
Circuit GDA-58513 had a reliability of 91 percent due to several major commercial
carrier problems. The circuit was on release at the beginning of the month and was
returned to service at 1335Z on February 1. At this time, it was noted to be open in
both directions and, shortly thereafter, was taking high errors on both paths. These
resulted from high impulse noise that continued into February 2 and was reported to be
on the satellite segment between earth stations at Etam, West Virginia and Aguimes,
Grand Canary Island. Service was restored at 2311Z on February 2, at which time the
circuit was released to laboratory facilities of the Network Review and Analysis Branch
of NASCOM at GSFC for testing. Tests were terminated and the circuit returned to
service on February 7. The original problem was noted as a faulty up-link converter
at Aguimes. Outage intervals recorded were 19:50 hours on February 1/2 and 13:46
hours on February 2.
The next notable problem occurred February 11 when a faulty amplifier at ATT's
New York-2 facility caused low levels on the transmit path for 1:41 hours. The same
path was affected by another amplifier trouble at that location and required level adjust-
ments at WUI New York on February 21. The lost time was 6:39 hours.
GRAND CANARY ISLAND VIA SATELLITE - GDA-58513
(Hours and Minutes)
TRANSMIT FROM RECEIVE AT
TROUBLE CATEGORY GSFC GSFC
DEC JAN FEB DEC JAN FEB
Commercial Carrier Fault 16:45 2:40 43:40 24:45 3:59 33:36
TOTAL OUTAGE 16:45 2:40 43:40 24:45 3:59 33:36
SCHED OPER TIME 744 446 423 744 446 423
RELIABILITY (Percent) 98 99 90 97 99 92
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Halethorpe- NST- 3798 -T
One-way circuit NST-3798-T incurred six significant commercial carrier failures
that were primarily responsible for the circuit's 98 percent reliability.
The six failures were due to tape reperforator problems. Three of these were
specific equipment troubles and caused outages of 2:06 hours on February 7, 2:00 hours
On February 11 and 2:08 hours on February 12. The other three were paper tape jams
that resulted in outages of 8:05 hours on February 12, 3:00 hours on February 17, and






Commercial Carrier Fault 34:56 73:41 23:20
Personnel Error - 24:22
Computer Fault - :02 :05
TOTAL OUTAGE 34:56 98:05 23:25
SCHED OPER TIME 744 742 672
RELIABILITY (Percent) 95 87 97
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Rosman -GDA-58152
As shown in the table below, a reduction in lost service time from commercial
carrier failures contributed to an increase in reliability for each path of circuit
GDA-58152.
During February, three failures were responsible for significant interruptions and
resulted from commercial carrier problems. These began on February 5 when the
receive path incurred low levels and noise. The accumulated lost time was 7:22 hours
before a cable trouble between Asheville and Rosman was corrected. The next occurred
on February 7 when 1:56 hours of outage occurred on both paths. Initially, GSFC was
unable to contact the site and, when ATT investigated, they found a system trouble
between Asheville and Rosman. This was corrected after 1:19 hours with the additional
37 minutes due to another undetermined problem. The next day, another unspecified
problem between the previously noted locations caused transmit path low levels and an




TRANSMIT FROM RECEIVE AT
GSFC GSFC
TROUBLE CATEGORIES
DEC JAN FEB DEC JAN FEB
RFO Unknown - - :37 - - :37
Commercial Carrier Fault 9:59 28:20 12:18 :08 28:20 8:59
TOTAL OUTAGE 9:59 28:20 12:55 :08 28:20 9:36
SCHED OPER TIME 744 744 672 744 744 672
RELIABILITY (Percent) 99 96 98 100 96 99
Santiago via Satellite-GDA-58665
The reliability of circuit GDA-58665 increased from 88 to 98 percent due primarily
to a decrease in commercial carrier failures. The comparative outage totals in this
category are listed, for each path, in the table below.
In February, failures in this category and their associated outages ranged from
8 minutes to 7:21 hours. The longest occurred on February 16 when high levels affected
the receive path. ATT verified their segment and ITT continued investigating the
cause of the level problem. Work continued into the next day when the problem cleared
before the cause could be located. The same path would not pass 7. 2 kbps data for
2:33 hours on February 9. The subsequent RFO was given as noise trouble on the
satellite segment between earth stations at Etam, West Virginia and Chile. The third
significant outage was 1:59 hours on February 13 that was caused by a microwave
trouble between El Roble Hill and Santiago and level adjustment at ITT New York.
SANTIAGO VIA SATELLITE - GDA-58665
(Hours and Minutes)
TRANSMIT FROM RECEIVE AT
TROUBLE CATEGORIES GSFC GSFC
DEC JAN FEB DEC JAN FEB
RFO Unknown - _ _ :03 :04 -
Commercial Carrier Fault 1:38 75:29 2:23 11:37 105:26 18:51
TOTAL OUTAGE 1:38 75:29 2:23 11:40 105:30 18:51
SCHED OPER TIME 744 728 672 744 728 672
RELIABILITY (Percent) 100 90 100 98 86 97
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Tananarive via Satellite -GDA-58524 & 58525
The reliabilities of circuits GDA-58524 and 58525 were 99 percent for the second
consecutive month with the majority of lost time caused by commercial carrier failures.
Three notable failures were common to both circuits. On February 6, the circuits
became open in both directions for 1:00 hour; this resulted from a shorted cable at the
NASA site in Tananarive. Another common event was a commercial carrier problem on
February 17 that caused noise on both paths of GDA-58525 for 1:24 hours and 1:23 hours
on GDA-58524. The trouble resulted from a faulty receiver at the earth station in
Tananarive. The third outage was 1:05 hours on February 18 while the circuits were
open and noisy. The cause was attributed to a faulty group receiver at the earth
station in Tsiranana, Malagasy.
One other notable failure affected GDA-58524. On February 11, both paths incurred
garbling, varying levels and noise for 1:10 hours. The problem was referred to WUI
who later advised GSFC that the symptoms cleared during checking.
Two other failures were significant on GDA-58525. On February 16, both paths
had low levels and would not pass 7. 2 kbps data. The lost time, 2:07 hours on each
path, resulted from a faulty loop at New York affecting the transmit path and a carrier
alignment at New York for the receive path. A mispatch at Etam, West Virginia
followed by noise that cleared while checking caused a receive path disruption of 2:10
hours on February 23.
TANANARIVE VIA SATELLITE - GDA-58524
(Hours and Minutes)
TRANSMIT FROM RECEIVE AT
TROUBLE CATEGORIES GSFC GSFC
DEC JAN FEB DEC JAN FEB
RFO Unknown :04 - _ :03 -
Commercial Carrier Fault 52:20 7:22 5:49 49:11 6:26 4:33
Equipment Fault/Adjustment - 1:00 :53 - 1:00
Computer Fault :06 :05 - :06 :05
TOTAL OUTAGE 52:20 7:32 6:54 50:04 6:35 5:38
SCHED OPER TIME 743 735 633 743 735 633
RELIABILITY (Percent) 93 99 99 93 99 99
TANANARIVE VIA SATELLITE - GDA-58525
(Hours and Minutes)
TRANSMIT FROM RECEIVE AT
TROUBLE CATEGORIES GSFC GSFC
DEC JAN FEB DEC JAN FEB
RFO Unknown _ :04 - _ :03 -
Commercial Carrier Fault 46:13 8:29 5:51 57:20 9:01 7:17
Equipment Fault/Adjustment - - 1:00 1:35 - 1:00
TOTAL OUTAGE 46:13 8:33 6:51 58:55 9:04 8:17
SCHED OPER TIME 743 735 634 743 735 634
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Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company
RCA Global Communications, Inc.
RCA Corporation, Alaska Communications
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Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
Southern Bell Telephone Company
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Cable
La Societe des Telecommunications
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Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
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Trans-Pacific Submarine Cable (ATT)
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United States Department of Agriculture
Voice Frequency
Voice Frequency Telegraph Terminal
Very High Frequency (30-300 MHz)
West Coast Switching Center
Western Union International, Incorporated
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